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Abstract
In response to pressures imposed on the energy sector, several countries in the Middle East-North Africa (MENA) region have 
committed to increasing the percentage of renewable energy to reach 15–50% of the energy supply by 2030. New governance 
models are required to conceptualise and guide the energy transition into a more sustainable direction. Therefore, this paper 
employed the transition management governance framework to answer the questions of who is governing the renewable 
energy transition in Palestine, and in what ways it is achieved. The analysis is based on three levels: strategic (problem struc-
turing and envisioning), tactical (coalition building, developing transition agenda), and operational (mobilising actors and 
implementing experiments). Accordingly, key energy-related institutions are examined in terms of their visions, capacities 
and scope of influence using semi-structured interviews, roundtable discussions, and a survey. The conducted policy analysis 
suggests that the Palestinian energy sector started experiencing profound changes that affected all actors who had to adapt or 
transform to remain active, in addition to the rise of various multi-level actors. The analysis also shows that actors are more 
connected compared to the conventional energy system. Findings suggest that the spread of renewable technologies was 
not the outcome of only top–down schemes; instead, it is achieved throughout the collaboration of multi-level institutions 
and increasing reliance on horizontal-based governance networks. The paper uses examples to imply that it is possible to 
overcome the agglomeration of restrictions imposed on the Palestinian energy sector due to conflict if established regimes 
support governance networks and local-level initiatives.
Keywords Energy transition · Transition management · Renewable energy · Institutions · Governance networks · Policy · 
Palestine · Conflict
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Introduction
Several countries in the Middle East-North Africa 
(MENA) region have committed to increasing the per-
centage of renewable energy to reach 15–50% of the 
energy supply by 2030 [1]. These targets are based on the 
enhancement of energy security, economic development 
and encountering resources scarcity [2]. Subsequently, 
conventional energy supply chains will be subjected to 
fundamental transformation to shift its reliance on sus-
tainable resources. Governing the energy transition into 
a sustainable path is a complicated process because of 
the diffusion of new decentralised technologies [3], the 
involvement of diverse multi-level actors [4], and the need 
for an original mix of policies [5].
Transitioning from conventional energy systems is not a 
change of technology only but also requires shifts in soci-
etal practices [6], institutions [7] and conventional govern-
ance models. Current societal systems are considered to 
be unsustainable from a long-term viewpoint and require 
structural changes to restore balance in the environment 
based on values of equity and justice [8]. Tackling these 
issues needs to reconsider the socio-technical, economic, 
institutional and environmental factors [9]. This is where 
transition theory is needed and can be effective, because 
it “provides an integrated analytical approach to concep-
tualise and understand complex, long-term processes of 
societal change as multi-causal, multi-actor, multi-level 
and multi-phase processes, and suggests a new mode of 
governance, transition management” [5].
The Middle East-North Africa (MENA) region, for 
instance, showcases a set of selection pressures imposed 
on their energy systems, characterised by volatile political 
situations, financial crisis and high rate of urbanisation. 
In addition to unavailability of natural resources in net 
importing oil countries [10]. Simultaneously, higher living 
standards, the growth of the middle class and the growing 
volume of industrial activities are leading towards a tre-
mendous increase in energy demand [11]. These pressures 
are pushing MENA governments to find alternative routes 
to provide continuous energy supply from diverse sources 
such as renewable energy, which marks the beginning of 
the energy transition [12]. The case of Palestine was cho-
sen because it captures the situation in various oil-depend-
ent countries in the MENA region in three ways. First, it is 
a country that has been under conflict for decades, where 
energy security is leading political agendas focused on 
meeting the rising growth in demand and stabilising the 
energy market [13]. Second, Palestine primarily depends 
on energy imports from neighbouring countries, because 
in 1967, Israel occupied its territories and prevented the 
energy sector from extracting resources and generating its 
energy [14]. Third, since 2009, the energy market started 
experiencing profound changes that are valuable to exam-
ine. These changes are originated by the introduction of 
renewable energy, especially the diffusion of Solar PV 
rooftop and utility-scale initiatives (Table 5 in “Appen-
dix”). The establishment of a legislative system accom-
panied these projects throughout releasing a series mix of 
policies, strategies and instructions supporting renewable 
energy (Fig. 5). Moreover, the market witnessed the rise of 
actors from multiple governance levels who are collaborat-
ing, launching initiatives, creating funding opportunities 
and implementing projects. Hence, the analysis provided 
in this paper shows that the energy transition in Pales-
tine is not only a discourse, but also the energy system 
is already changing at a slow pace due to conflict forces.
Most studies in the MENA region focus on assessing the 
feasibility of renewable energy for energy supply from a 
technical viewpoint [10, 15, 16] whilst giving little consid-
eration to socio-technical dynamics, governance and institu-
tional issues [4]. Accordingly, this paper will tackle this gap 
using the transition management (TM) approach as a new 
integrative governance framework that connects theory and 
practice [8]. The transition management approach merges 
long-term ambitions with short-term action. It does so in 
multiple levels and phases by identifying the problems, then 
establishing a long-term transition vision and agenda, and 
creating networks to develop the process. To make the tran-
sition feasible and tangible, pilot projects are implemented 
before scaling up, followed by an evaluation phase for learn-
ing, and adaptation [17].
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the renew-
able energy transition in Palestine to provide scholarly 
analysis and aid in the upcoming stages of policy design. 
The research will focus on changes in policies, governing 
actors, networks and niche projects. The main research 
questions guiding this paper are (1) What is the value of 
promoting renewable energy transition in conflict contexts 
such as Palestine? (2) What are the key institutions govern-
ing the renewable energy transition and how it is achieved? 
(3) How does the agency of niche activities and governance 
networks influence the renewable energy transition? These 
questions will be explored throughout the three transition 
management abstraction levels because of their effectiveness 
in conceptualising complex systems. On the strategic level 
(section 64), this paper will show how problem structuring 
is a vital step and resulted in a significant change of perspec-
tive towards the potential of the renewable energy transi-
tion in the Palestinian context. After problem structuring, a 
transition vision is established to move forward. As for the 
tactical level (section 65), it is explored by analysing policy 
reforms (post-2009) in the Palestinian energy sector, which 
resembles the commencement of socio-technical transitions. 
This level also intends to highlight coalition building efforts, 
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which could potentially empower institutions in conflict con-
texts through capacity building. Then comes the operational 
level (section 6), which focuses on mobilising actors and 
implementing pilot projects. A typology of the key govern-
ing actors will be presented concerning their visions, capaci-
ties, internal changes and niche projects to understand how 
they shape the transition (Fig. 1).
The conventional energy system is based on top-down 
and centralised governance structures. However, this 
research hypothesises that governing the renewable energy 
transition will be attained throughout multi-level actors 
horizontally coordinating resources and capabilities, with 
increased significance for both niche and local initiatives 
[18]. Instead of merely discussing transition outcomes as 
numbers, this research will incorporate qualitative methods, 
including interviews, roundtable discussions, a survey, and 
documentary analysis (Sect. 3). Qualitative methods are pro-
cess-oriented, which will allow the researchers to untangle 
the interconnected complex issues at play [19].
The Palestinian energy transition is considered to be in 
the pre-development phase [5], which is the most flexible in 
terms of changing paradigms. Accordingly, findings from 
this paper will contribute to the ongoing policy discourses 
by providing novel insights. Even though TM is not fully 
adopted by Palestinian institutions, the application of its 
holistic governance framework (Fig. 2) will highlight poten-
tial gaps in existing governance structures. The framework 
will also illustrate new ways to think about and guide the 
renewable energy transition. Moreover, results from this 
paper will be shared with Palestinian energy-related institu-
tions in communication events (e.g. policy briefs). The avail-
able literature tends to concentrate primarily on low-carbon 
development in the Global North. Consequently, this paper 
will contribute to the field of energy transition by showing 
new perspectives from the Global South, where policy agen-
das are driven by energy security instead of decarbonisation. 
40% of the population in Arab countries are estimated to live 
in conflict condition by 2030 [20]; hence, results may be 
extended to benefit other contexts under conflict with similar 
conditions to Palestine.
Transitions and transition management
Transitions are complex processes that structurally trans-
form societal systems from one established stable system 
to another throughout the coevolution of technologies, 
policies, institutions, markets, and even behaviours [21]. 
Transitions are stimulated from a multitude of forces and 
have many outcomes. Transition theory is developed as 
multi-phase and multi-level (Fig. 1). These two analytical 
Fig. 1  Multi-phase and multi-level models of transition. Source: Geels (2002) [5, 22]
Fig. 2  Activity clusters in transition management framework. Source: 
Loorbach and Rotmans (2009) [17]
72 Energy Transitions (2020) 4:69–90
1 3
concepts are merged to understand the temporal dimen-
sion and the dynamics of transitions in terms of its state 
and potential to trigger fundamental change [8]. Transition 
management is the central approach utilised in this paper to 
provide insights about pragmatic governance strategies that 
are effective in guiding the energy transition into a sustain-
able direction.
The central assumption in transition theory is that soci-
etal structures undergo long phases of relative stability, pro-
ceeded by short periods of fundamental change, whereby 
new structures emerge as a result [8]. In energy transitions, 
structural changes do not occur in phases only, but they are 
also caused by multiple actors at different levels [5]. There-
fore, it is essential to consider the analysis of the system as 
a whole, including the dominant structures, new configura-
tions (niche initiatives) and the surrounding environment 
(context). The multiple level perspective (MLP), derived 
from technology and innovation studies, is one of the most 
frequently utilised models when analysing socio-technical 
transitions [22].
MLP embodies energy systems as regimes captured 
between two interrelated levels (Fig. 1). First is the land-
scape level, which includes social and physical dynamics 
such as policy paradigms, political coalitions, socio-cultural 
norms and economic conditions. Overall, it represents the 
external conditions for the regime level [23]. Second, are 
niche configurations at the bottom level, where innovations 
emerge by conducting pilot projects, in addition to develop-
ing new methods to fulfil social demand [24]. As for the 
regime level (middle), it provides the selection environment 
(existing conditions) for the introduction of novel technolo-
gies from the niche level [25]. Regimes are naturally stable 
and resilient to change, meaning that they can hinder innova-
tions if incompatible with the regimes’ vision. This phenom-
enon is known as technological lock-in [26], which explains 
why regimes prefer stability over changing. Nonetheless, 
regime transitions are possible and achievable [27]. MLP 
suggests that niches do not automatically replace incumbent 
regimes. Instead, niches have to destabilise regimes, which 
can occur in various non-linear pathways such as proving 
their effectiveness, or when external pressures are applied 
on the landscape level [5]. This is witnessed in the Pales-
tinian energy sector, where renewable energy projects are 
proving their feasibility and slowly attempting to find ways 
to become one of the main sources in the future energy mix 
(Fig. 8).
This research will employ the cyclical multi-level govern-
ance framework (Fig. 2) developed by Rotmans and Loor-
bach (2009) to analyse the Palestinian renewable energy 
transition from a pragmatic viewpoint. The framework 
distinguishes four activity clusters on four different levels 
[17]. First is the strategic level, where understanding and 
defining the problem take place. The purpose of this level is 
to develop a long-term vision that gives direction to social 
development throughout leadership capacity and strategic 
discussions. The purpose of the vision is about guidance 
more than imposing fixed set rules. Visions, even if dis-
turbed, are necessary for conflict contexts such as Pales-
tine. Visions ensure efforts are being directed in a particu-
lar direction, especially when the energy sector is heavily 
influenced by many forces. Second is the tactical level that 
aims to foster new networks and coalition amongst actors. 
The end product of this level is creating a transition agenda 
including new policies, strategies and medium-term goals 
at the sector level. Actors in Palestine are geographically 
separated because of the Israeli physical barriers (Fig. 4). 
For example, knowledge transfer of successful projects 
is difficult under current circumstances to the extent that 
actors are not aware of what is happening in other regions 
of the country (e.g. Gaza-Strip- and West-Bank). Therefore, 
TM encourages creating and maintaining networks as an 
effective way to unite and magnify efforts. The third activ-
ity cluster is the operational level, which entails translating 
the transition vision, and intermediate goals into concrete 
projects and practices. These efforts act as experiments for 
the sake of learning and refining the proposed strategies. 
Implementing pilot projects to enable the transition is crucial 
for Palestine, to explore ways to overcome obstacles because 
each region has its own set of complexities due to conflict. 
The last level is the evaluation and monitoring, which is a 
comprehensive review process that takes place on all levels 
and stages of the transition, to allow for reflection and adap-
tation. Evaluation is often overlooked in projects in Pales-
tine. Hence, adopting the TM process will force involved 
actors to systemically achieve such a vital step to complete 
the TM cycle.
Many scholars have criticised transition management 
because it is considered as a type of social engineering, 
which focuses only on technocratic issues and overlooks 
external forces [28]. In other words, it can be argued that 
TM is not suitable for conflict scenarios, because it aims to 
manage the transition [29], where the notion of management 
in such contexts is often interrupted by external forces. How-
ever, the management aspect of TM is not meant to impose 
rules, but to challenge the notion of top-down approach by 
creating an arena for frontrunners to take action. Therefore, 
TM is beneficial in adverse situations as it offers a grand 
framework that supports actors to work in an organised and 
organic manner to facilitate the transition process. Whilst it 
is true that TM might be slowed down or interrupted due to 
uncertainties, it is essential to note that TM is ingrained in 
complex systems theory that deals with uncertainty, com-
plexity, and unexpected outcomes [28]. In practice, it can 
accommodate activities that coevolve spontaneously with-
out a clear order, and without distinction between actors 
to determine who is inside or outside the transition arena. 
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Actors are not quite like transition managers; instead, they 
have a particular role in the transition process. Hence, TM 
is chosen in this paper because it is a model for exploring 
new paths through a reflexive policy that can handle risks 
and unforeseen events in adverse political conditions such 
as Palestine.
The literature on MLP tends to overlook the analysis of 
niche level interventions in the governance and develop-
ment of the energy sector [30]. This research will approach 
this gap by considering the role of local authorities as 
niche actors in the energy sector. Although local authori-
ties hold a minor position in the current centralised energy 
system, there is a growing literature tracing their increased 
engagement in the realm of sustainable energy. Fudge et al. 
[31] identified three reasons why local authorities are suit-
able as niche actors because of their political influence on 
local level; their capability of accessing and engaging with 
citizens (participatory); and their efficacy to deal with the 
implementation of distributed nature of new technologies in 
terms of planning and its related legal concerns (e.g. com-
munity microgeneration and district heating).
Methodology
Palestine’s energy sector exhibits various characteristics 
and challenges prevailing in the MENA region and other 
countries under conflict that are valuable to examine. This 
paper will focus on reforms post-2009 aiming to promote 
domestic electricity generation from renewable sources 
(primarily solar energy). Geographically, it will focus on 
the West-Bank because Gaza-Strip is challenging to access 
due to the political situation. The methodological approach 
aims to integrate the transition management framework in 
Fig. 2 with empirical reflections from data collected from 
a fieldwork conducted in January 2019. Therefore, a set of 
qualitative research methods will be applied including semi-
structured interviews, roundtable discussions, surveys and 
documentary analysis, to identify intervention points [32] by 
highlighting changes in the institutional context and actors’ 
networks.
Qualitative methods are process-oriented allowing the 
researchers to obtain a precise and vivid representation 
of energy governance [19]. They are more flexible and 
reflective compared to quantitative methods [33]. Instead 
of merely focusing on the outcomes, qualitative methods 
are effective in examining complex systems, decisions, and 
various conditions that lead to the outcomes. A review of 
energy-related projects and initiatives was conducted (see 
Table 5 in “Appendix”) in conjunction with the ministry of 
energy to identify a list of the most relevant contacts. Then, 
a total of 28 semi-structured interviews were conducted dur-
ing the fieldwork using nonprobability sampling method, 
in addition to two roundtable discussions (see Table 2 in 
“Appendix”). Interviews included government officials, 
private sector representatives, international development 
organisations, financial institutions and academics. The 
researchers are aware that bias might arise from this type of 
sampling process. However, the response sample includes all 
key energy-related actors from diverse projects across Pal-
estine in different geographical areas and scales. Moreover, 
the sample covers the views of both existing and potential 
key actors related to the energy sector.
Questions and discussions with participants were 
divided into three categories: the dimensions of the Pales-
tinian energy system and the changing status quo; policy 
approaches and projects of governing institutions; and inter-
actions, partnerships and networks formed. Most interviews 
were held in Arabic, transcribed and analysed after translat-
ing them to English. An exploratory analysis was applied to 
highlight the main features of the energy transition and the 
governing institutions. Moreover, the analysis focused on 
spotting patterns of changes in response to the renewable 
energy transition.
In addition to the interviews that acted as the primary 
data collection method, a survey was distributed across 20 
municipalities in Palestine. 11 responses were collected 
(including six of the biggest municipalities) and analysed 
by filtering the results, creating graphs and research themes 
from the data to draw findings. The purpose of the survey is 
to explore the engagement of municipalities in the energy 
sector; and moreover, to gauge to which extent municipali-
ties are influencing the energy transition to assess whether 
they can be considered as one of the main actors responsible 
for delivering the transition agenda or not.
Documentary analysis was also conducted to analyse the 
case under examination. Official policy documents, regula-
tions and instructions published by the government were 
collected and integrated into the analysis to determine the 
government’s position and comprehend the driving factors 
shaping the energy transition pathways (Section 5.1). More-
over, other studies and reports from international organisa-
tions, and other non-state actors were also analysed to obtain 
a comprehensive overview of the various perspectives in the 
Palestinian energy sector.
Strategic: problem structuring 
and envisioning
The purpose of the strategic level of TM is to establish a 
vision to mobilise potential and encourage actors to com-
mit to an overarching goal that guides the transition. How-
ever, before formulating the vision, it is essential to agree 
on a new shared approach on how problems at the system 
level should be tackled. For the energy system, it means 
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identifying and understanding the selection pressures that 
are disturbing the current system and demanding change. 
This section will begin by briefly discussing the key fea-
tures of the Palestinian energy system, highlight the selec-
tion pressures, then present the new energy transition vision.
The geopolitical situation Palestine is experiencing 
yielded a distinctive energy sector compared to countries in 
the MENA region [10]. In 1967, the Palestinian territories 
were occupied by Israel, controlling all aspects of infrastruc-
ture. As a result, the Palestinian energy sector was dismantled 
from its generation and transmission capacities throughout 
a deliberate, incremental process resulting in a dependent 
consumer market [14]. Until now, Palestine meets its energy 
needs by being predominantly dependent on imports from 
neighbouring countries (Fig. 3). The Israeli Electric Corpo-
ration (IEC) provides more than 90% of electricity to Pales-
tine [34]. The rest of imports are distributed between other 
neighbouring countries of Jordan and Egypt. In addition, 
Gaza Power Plant (GPP) supplies energy to Gaza-Strip with 
a generation capacity of 140 MW (currently rated at 90 MW).
Palestine showcases two completely different situations. 
Gaza-Strip with high unserved demand resulting in more 
than 8 h of daily electricity blackouts (GPP was destroyed 
by Israeli attacks in 2014) [35]. On the other hand, the 
West-Bank has a continuous power supply but with a high 
cost comprising 9% of household expenditure, which is the 
highest in the MENA region [36]. The challenge of achiev-
ing energy security is also complicated, especially with the 
annual upsurge in energy demand of an approximate average 
rate of 3.5% due to urbanisation and economic growth [11].
Interview data are showing that it is no longer feasible 
to depend on IEC for electricity imports. Because it is dif-
ficult to get permissions from IEC to expand the capacity of 
electricity imports to meet the growing demand (interviews 
14 and 15), and it is cost inefficient [34]. From a legal per-
spective, the Palestinian energy sector requires substantial 
upgrading for the regulations and legislation to encour-
age niche activities whilst maintaining energy supply bal-
ance [38]. Another issue is Israeli legislation, which adds 
another layer of obstruction to introduce any change. From 
a technical point of view, Palestine is not allowed to build 
a national transmission system, nor it is easy to get per-
missions to establish new connection points where power 
can be discharged [39]. Moreover, Palestinian distribution 
companies are not allowed to connect their electrical grids 
(Fig. 9), which results in a high power loss during distribu-
tion [11]. These sample pressures imply that new solutions 
should consider electricity generation to be near production, 
Fig. 3  The composition and layout of the main sources of energy supply. Source: Author’s Aggregation based on World Bank [34], PETL, and 
PENRA [37]
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which is achievable in case renewable energy technology is 
supported.
The imposed restrictions from the Israeli occupation as 
presented above are indeed the strongest force on the Pal-
estinian energy sector. It is also one of the main reasons 
that pushed the Palestinian Government and energy-related 
actors to search and adopt alternative paths to progress the 
energy sector (interview 6). Instead of focusing on obstacles 
only, this paper seeks to shift the focus lens and highlight the 
available unexploited potential in the renewable energy sec-
tor under the current political situation. Several interviews 
stated that restructuring the energy sector has the potential 
to empower institutions, increase justice and create new 
partnerships (interviews 3, 5 and 23). All of this can put 
Palestine on the track to achieve energy independence. The 
change of actors’ perspective means that a structural change 
is required on the systems level, which is not confined to a 
change in technology only. Instead, it is a national neces-
sity with numerous benefits. This change of perspective is 
equivalent to ‘problem structuring’ step introduced by tran-
sition management.
Based on the problem structuring phase, the Palestinian 
energy sector released a vision with four main pillars [37]: 
(1) increase the volume of domestic generation by exploit-
ing local resources to reduce reliance on energy imports; (2) 
increase the percentage of renewable energy in the energy 
mix; (3) enhance and implement energy efficiency measures 
from production to consumption; and (4) reach energy secu-
rity throughout diversification of sources, which includes 
establishing regional connectivity and power exchange with 
neighbouring countries. As the energy sector is still pre-
dominantly controlled by Israel, a new agreement entitled 
‘Establishment of a New Market in Palestine’ was signed 
between the Palestinian and Israeli parties under the supervi-
sion of international bodies (Office of the Quartet) pursuing 
to transfer significant control and authority over the electric-
ity sector in the West-Bank to PENRA [39]. Another agree-
ment was reached in 2018 worth $775 million. In which 
the Palestinian Electricity Transmission Company (PETL) 
will control the delivery of electricity to the West-Bank, 
throughout the establishment of four high-voltage power 
plants [40]. For renewable energy, a strategy was developed 
in 2012 [41] by only PENRA and its related institutions 
(Fig. 7), in addition to international organisations for tech-
nical and financial assistance. The feasibility was based on 
conducted on-ground measures and studies alongside few 
established pilot projects that encouraged the government 
and many multi-level actors to consider investing in renewa-
ble energy systems. Although the energy vision was initially 
created in a top-down manner, the government is now more 
aware that the market expanded, where diverse actors and 
their experiences and business models should be included to 
be inclusive (interview 6). For example, PENRA invited a 
wide range of multi-level actors to contribute to the creation 
of the 2020 renewable energy strategy. Overall, it is essen-
tial to note that the origin of the Palestinian energy vision 
and strategies emanate from the necessity to both acquire 
independence from the Israeli occupation and advance the 
energy sector.
Despite the wide-ranging energy supply options the 
national vision aspires to develop, renewable energy is the 
only energy source that can be generated on Palestinian land 
under the current Israeli restrictions. In contrary, building a 
fossil fuel-based power station, for example, requires con-
tinuous fuel imports (for operation) and permissions, which 
is difficult to obtain from the Israeli side (RD1). Therefore, 
renewable energy projects are relatively easier to implement 
under current conditions. Solar, wind and biomass feature 
high potential in Palestine [10]. Solar energy holds the high-
est potential that can be relied upon with 3000 sunshine 
hours annually [15]. In heating applications, 57% of Pales-
tinian households have solar water heater systems, which is 
the highest installation percentage in the Middle East [42]. 
Moreover, promoting domestic generation from renewable 
sources is not only socially and technically feasible but eco-
nomically viable. In 2022, the cost of electricity per mega-
watt generated from renewables is expected to be cheaper 
than imported options [34]. Having an excellent solar poten-
tial, embedded social practices (abundance of solar heaters 
is an encouraging factor for the success of solar PV [43]) 
and economic feasibility are essential factors for decision-
makers and investors when building their transition agenda 
in the tactical level.
The deployment of renewable technologies depends on the 
availability and accessibility of land. Hence, it is essential not 
to overlook the spatial constraints shown in Fig. 4. Regarding 
solar electricity, the technical potential (from PV and CSP) in 
the West-Bank is estimated to be 103 MW in areas A and B, 
and a staggering 3374 MW in Area C (not accessible due to 
Israeli constraints) [34]. Although renewable energy is crucial 
in the new energy mix for Palestine, it is still not waived from 
complexities of the conflict. The agglomeration of restrictions 
on the Palestinian land (Fig. 4) imposes tremendous pressures 
on decision-makers to find solutions to overcome the issue of 
land such as national rooftop schemes (see “Massader energy 
infrastructure developer (frontrunner)”).
Tactical level: coalition building 
and developing transition agendas
After creating a new discourse and establishing a vision, a 
transition agenda should be created, which is the objective 
of the tactical level. This entails translating the vision into 
specific goals, and strategies whilst simultaneously building 
networks to innovate, manage, and sustain the process [8]. 
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Transition images and paths are used as instruments to pro-
duce the agenda, which are defined as the collective images 
that formulate the overall vision, and the required routes to 
reach those images through intermediate milestones [17]. 
This section will briefly present the main transition paths 
and coalition building efforts.
Transition path
In the past decade, the Palestinian energy sector witnessed 
a drastic transformation from only importing electricity and 
petroleum products towards comprehensive reforms which 
call for energy supply diversification and infrastructure 
development. After analysing various documents and inter-
view data from several actors, the energy transition in Pal-
estine can be categorised into three main paths: renewable 
energy technologies (Fig. 5), energy efficiency measures 
(Fig. 6) and fossil fuel-based infrastructure. Collectively, 
this will require a new set of policy approaches and institu-
tional setup.
This paper will focus on the first path, which is the pro-
motion of renewable energy throughout a series of new laws, 
regulations and strategies (Fig. 5). In 2012, the Council of 
Ministers issued a decision that established the legal base 
for the utilisation of renewables in Palestine and approved 
the “General Strategy for Renewable Energy in Palestine” 
(see Table 4 in “Appendix”). The target seeks to achieve 10% 
(130 MW) of electricity production from renewable sources 
by 2020 [41]. For the period 2020 until 2030, the energy 
authority (PENRA) expanded the target to achieve 500 MW 
(the target would be 300 MW in case Area C is not still not 
accessible). In addition to new policies and strategies, the 
declining prices of renewable technologies contributed to 
growth of renewable energy capacity. For example, the value 
of Solar PV systems imports increased from 590,000$ in 
2013 to 3,915,000$ in 2017 [44].
The second pillar is energy efficiency measures, which 
can add a valuable contribution to energy security, where 
growth in renewable energy must be coupled with consider-
able measures to reduce energy demand. Energy efficiency 
measures are crucial, especially for the residential sector in 
Palestine, which is the highest consumption segment absorb-
ing 62% of final energy [36]. A new strategy was established 
with the collaboration of PENRA, World Bank and French 
Development Agency (AFD) entitled “National Energy 
Fig. 4  The geopolitical 
administrative divisions by 
Osolo II accord in 1995, which 
divides the West-Bank into 
three categories: Area A, B, 
and C [10]. Area A designates 
full civil and security control 
for the Palestinian government. 
Area B allocates civilian issues 
to Palestine, but security under 
Israeli control. As for Area C, 
Israel administers both civil and 
security affairs. It is worth not-
ing that 60% of Palestine’s land 
in the West-Bank is classified 
as Area C with more than 140 
Israeli distributed settlements 
and more than 250 closures 
between Palestinian cities, 
town, and villages [10]. Source: 
Author’s illustration
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Efficiency Action Plan II (NEEAP II)”. Unlike previous 
plans that focused only on reducing energy demand (NEEAP 
I) [11], NEEAP II offers an additional layer that proposes 
to restructure the market. The plan seeks to introduce new 
sector-wide concepts such as demand side management as 
well as the utilisation of smart technologies (Fig. 6).
Fig. 5  Renewable energy laws and regulations (y-axis); renewable 
energy targets (x-axis). PENRA created few mechanisms and tools 
to expedite the execution of the renewable strategy, including feed-
in tariffs, net metering scheme, and competitive biddings. Despite the 
slow start, 157  MW (16% of West-Bank capacity) of permits were 
granted by PENRA to the private sector be implemented until 2021 
[50]; meaning renewable energy generation will increase by sixfold in 
3 years. Source: Author’s aggregation, based on PERC
Fig. 6  The graph is showing NEEPII target which is proposed to reduce the total consumption of electricity, during 2020–2030 by 5%, in addi-
tion to the three phases of the implementation strategy. Source: Author’s aggregation based on World Bank [11]
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The third path is fossil fuels-based technologies and 
supporting infrastructure ranging from natural gas power 
stations to oil field exploration. Since energy transition in 
Palestine is triggered by the need to enhance energy secu-
rity as a priority, the development of natural gas resources 
alongside renewables is significant for economic growth 
(interview 9). Unlike countries in the global north, where 
decarbonising efforts lead their energy agendas. All three 
paths presented above are developed with the intention of 
breaking from Israeli control and restrictions by diversifying 
energy sources (interview 5). This explains the support for 
renewable energy, primarily Solar PV, because it is relatively 
the easiest to implement compared to other paths.
Networking and coalition building
Coalition building is essential to enable the creation and 
implementation of the transition agenda. These efforts were 
observed in two situations; the first was in the development of 
an institutional setup that is capable of overseeing and steer-
ing the process. After extensive efforts in the last decade to 
formalise, legitimise and organise the energy arena, the Pal-
estinian energy sector now displays proper legal and regula-
tory frameworks, a suitable market model, well-defined insti-
tutions, and identifiable market players as shown in Fig. 7.
The second type of observed coalition building was in 
the recently initiated Renewable Energy Group (REWG) in 
2016 by the Applied Research Institute in Jerusalem (ARIJ) 
[45]. The purpose of creating REWG is to leverage existing 
resources, by bringing various stakeholders together from 
the government, private sector, NGOs and international 
community. This platform is the first of its kind in the Pales-
tinian energy sector to be created for knowledge sharing and 
assembling actors on an equal footing to discuss pressing 
energy-related issues. The network mandates the formation 
of effective communication and coordination efforts between 
stakeholders to share best practices, experiences, and local 
knowledge to empower the renewable energy sector. In addi-
tion, REWG seeks to resolve contestation, inform policy, and 
conduct capacity-building activities.
Currently, the group is still in the phase of building the 
inter-organisational relationship between actors and expand-
ing the membership by inviting relevant stakeholders; in 
addition to undertaking field visits to solar PV projects to 
share lessons learned. REWG launched an online “Innova-
tive Energy Platform” that grants members the access to pro-
jects’ monitoring, publications, and training material, which 
enhanced the group’s internal management. Simultaneously, 
REWG is gaining more influence because of its hybrid struc-
ture comprising a diverse range of influential actors from 
the public and private sectors. For example, actors are able 
throughout this group to channel their feedback on energy 
policy directly to the government via its representatives. 
Even though the process of influencing policy in REWG is 
still informal, this network is expected to be more involved 
in future energy policy discourses.
Until now, actors in the Palestinian energy sector still 
have the ’competing mindset’ more than the collaborating 
Fig. 7  Palestinian Energy Sector Institutional Framework. Source: Modified from PENRA
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one (interview 28). The Palestinian energy transition can 
benefit from TM as it reinforces collaboration as one of 
the vital steps before moving to the implementation phase, 
which is needed in conflict contexts to unite efforts and mini-
mise resistance to change.
Operational level: mobilising actors 
and implementing transition experiments
The focus of the operational level of TM is developing pilot 
projects (experiments) that use new ideas, insights and 
knowledge to make the transition vision and agenda tangi-
ble [17]. This level entails nurturing niches of innovation 
by engaging actors in networking events and concrete pro-
jects. The operational level is essential for social learning, 
coevolution of institutions and technology, and building the 
necessary confidence to scale-up operations [5]. Renewable 
energy investments in Palestine are currently widespread and 
made by diverse actors (Table 5 in “Appendix”). Before these 
investments were prevailing, international organisations in 
collaboration with Palestinian public institutions conducted 
few pilot projects. For example, Jericho’s Solar PV station 
is one of the earliest small-scale pilot projects that encour-
aged the government and many actors to consider investing 
in renewable energy systems (interview 22). Another exam-
ple is the Palestinian Environment Quality Authority, which 
conducted successful pilot projects on schools’ rooftops. Fol-
lowing a phase of pilot projects, several utility-scale invest-
ments (1–5 MW) came from many local entrepreneurs with 
available lands in Area A and B and factory owners, espe-
cially in the northern part of Palestine such as Tubas, Ya’bad, 
and Ajeh. Section “Operational level: mobilising actors and 
implementing transition experiments” will present a typology 
of the multi-level actors involved in the transition. The aim is 
to highlight changes in implemented projects, organisational 
structures, and governance tactics.
Incumbent regime
Palestinian energy authorities
The Palestinian Energy and Natural Resources (PENRA) 
is established in 1995 and delegated to be the responsible 
institution for the stability of energy supply. In addition, 
PENRA is the official representative of Palestine with neigh-
bouring countries to facilitate energy imports. Since 2009, 
PENRA was leading the sectorial and policy reforms. Con-
currently, PENRA experienced profound changes both in 
terms of internal organisational change, and throughout the 
creation of few specialised institutions (PERC, PETL, PEC, 
and energy efficiency unit; see Fig. 7) to meet the wide-
ranging demands of the energy sector. Whilst this shows 
the government’s understanding of the complexity of the 
energy transition, their role remains centralised as all deci-
sions are made either by PENRA or institutions under its 
influence. However, these new institutions are responsible 
for producing significant structural changes in the energy 
sector throughout promoting niche initiatives.
The role of PENRA and its related institutions is focused 
on legitimation. They are responsible for translating the 
vision into policies to make domestic generation from 
renewable sources available and suitable for other actors. 
This engagement resulted in the creation of multiple policy 
instruments and regulations, which illustrates the govern-
ment’s flexibility to respond to the increasing demand for 
renewables (Fig. 5). Interviews show that PENRA’s vision 
by 2030 aims to diversify the energy supply by increasing 
domestic generation from various sources whilst ensuring 
imports do not exceed 50% of the energy mix (Fig. 8). In 
addition to policymaking, PENRA has been involved in sev-
eral niche initiatives and experiments themselves. For exam-
ple, they launched the Palestinian Solar Initiative (PSI) in 
2011, which entails the installation of solar PV systems on 
the rooftops of 1000 households. Although PSI completed 
Fig. 8  PENRA’s vision for 2030 is to diversify electricity supply and limit dependency on external sources to a maximum of 50%. Simultane-
ously, diminishing unserved demand in Gaza-Strip is a priority on the short-term. Source: World Bank [34]
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only 400 homes [38], this residential scheme was suspended 
due to insufficient financial capabilities, because this program 
was subsidised using a fixed feed-in-tariff [46]. Despite the 
slow start, the government updated and released new instruc-
tions, laws and targets until 2030, to grant investors a stimu-
lating environment to foster their confidence to participate.
Another successful project conducted by PENRA in 
partnership with few international organisations was using 
renewable energy to provide critical infrastructure with con-
tinuous energy supply. For example, powering surgical rooms 
in hospitals using solar PV where the gird was damaged due 
to the conflict. Instead of paying a range of US$6–US$10 
million annually to provide electricity for hospitals in Gaza, 
PENRA is diverting a portion of the amounts to establish 
solar PV systems on hospitals’ rooftops. This scheme is 
an alternative to importing fuel for generators at a fraction 
of the cost. Despite the extensive damage caused on Gaza 
power plant and its import lines, efforts to harness the abun-
dant energy of the sun through rooftop solar systems have 
increased by tenfold in Gaza-Strip [34]. After a series of fea-
sible pilot projects, more than 500KW rooftop installations 
were completed by 2018. Moreover, 34 critical units within 
ten hospitals in Gaza are prepared with an expected cost of 
US$4 million [47]. Another similar initiative where PENRA 
leveraged renewable energy was in refugee camps and dis-
placed communities, where the grid is not accessible. Renew-
able energy, especially solar, has significantly contributed to 
various humanitarian relief efforts for being easily accessible, 
safe, and economically and environmentally viable.
Electricity distribution companies
Despite the small size of Palestine, there are six operating 
distribution companies (DISCOs); five of them operate in 
West-Bank and one in Gaza-Strip (Fig. 9). Moreover, there 
are few additional distributors in the West-Bank, such as 
municipalities attempting to meet the demand of their geo-
graphically separated localities. The new mix of policies and 
regulations adopted by the government imposes challenges 
on DISCOs as they are required to change the way they oper-
ate substantially, as explained by JEDCO:
“We see change characterised in three ways: decen-
tralisation, decarbonisation, and digitalisation; none 
of them is compatible with the way we operate…. we 
are using a new suite of tools and business models. 
Currently, the energy sector has ambitious strategies 
that oblige us to integrate and manage hundreds of 
megawatts of renewables into our grdid, which is less 
predictable and less controllable” (Interview 17).
Before the 2009 electricity sector reforms, DISCOs were 
the sole institution responsible for all electricity-related 
activities in their ‘island-like’ areas (cities and towns not 
connected due to Israeli barriers). The interviewed DIS-
COs are concerned about their position and future in the 
changing energy sector. One reason for this is that they are 
not systematically included in the sector decision-making 
process taking place at PENRA. They believe they have dif-
ferent insights, capacities and resources to offer. Moreover, 
interviews suggest that DISCOs perceive themselves until 
now (post-reforms) to be the principal decision-makers and 
visionaries for their areas. However, the nature of the renew-
able energy transition is pushing DISCOs to be more col-
laborative and align their visions with other actors if they 
want to cope with the ongoing structural changes.
In response to the changing energy landscape, interviews 
show that all DISCOs have seen considerable changes in 
their institutional structure, thinking, and methods. For 
instance, renewable energy departments in diverse forms 
are established inside the structure of DISCOs to facilitate 
the integration of renewable energy into their grid. Moreo-
ver, few companies such as JEDCO established new tech-
nical and academic training centres (e.g. a renewable lab 
at the Palestinian Incubator for Energy) to provide training 
Fig. 9  Mapping electricity distribution of DISCOs and municipalities 
according to their coverage area. Source: Author’s illustration based 
on PETL
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sessions to staff, graduate students, and start-ups. The pur-
pose of such efforts is to enable participants to join the new 
renewable energy market, in addition to raising awareness 
to members of the civil society. Developing digitalisation 
capacities is another aspect witnessed amongst DISCOs, 
which is reflected in decisions taken based on simulations, 
scenario planning, and investing in building computational 
proficiencies to aid strategic planning (e.g. NEPLAN soft-
ware). DISCOs are also working on introducing elements of 
demand side management to enhance energy efficiency as 
a response to PENRA’s efficiency strategy (NEEAP II) by 
interacting with customers throughout pre-paid and smart 
meters [48].
The role of DISCOs is intermediary as they partially 
control and possess in-depth technical knowledge about the 
grid. This means that changes experienced by DISCOs are 
valuable and having them on board is essential to progress 
the transition. However, as the electrical grid is shared and 
controlled by Israel and was not initially designed to inte-
grate generation from renewable sources and in a bi-direc-
tional manner, there is a limitation to the capacity allowed 
to integrate renewables. DISCOs are increasingly investing 
in their infrastructure to integrate renewable projects better. 
However, this process is complicated as DISCOs have to get 
permissions from the Israeli side for any expansion they aim 
to execute, as noted by TEDCO:
“Recently we released a bid to construct the first wind 
turbine in Palestine…at first, we faced rejection from 
Israel claiming it is for safety reasons…we re-adjusted 
the design several times in different ways such as 
reducing the overall height, even though it will reduce 
the generation capacity and increase the investment 
cost. Our tactics depend on perseverance…. we will 
continue adjusting the design, involve international 
parties, and negotiate; eventually, we will get our per-
mission” (RD 1).
It is essential to bear in mind that the spatial aspects 
can drastically hinder or encourage DISCOs in executing 
more renewable energy projects. For example, Tubas, where 
TEDCO, is a small town in the north of West-Bank with a 
vast amount of land categorised as Areas A and B. TEDCO 
has more room to build solar plants compared to other DIS-
COs located in highly urbanised areas or zones categorised 
in Area C that are controlled by Israel. Uneven development 
might arise from these restrictions, and it becomes crucial 
to integrate spatial consideration in energy planning in the 
upcoming phases of the transition.
Niche actors, projects and networks
The Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Educa-
tion (MoEHE) executed more than 154 solar PV projects by 
2018 over public schools’ rooftops. Interview data imply 
that MoEHE is considered to be a dynamic player in the 
renewable energy transition. This is primarily because they 
are utilising the vast unused space on schools’ rooftops for 
microgeneration, given the geopolitical situation that limits 
access to land. Some of the early projects were established 
in cooperation with the private sector, the government and 
international originations as experiments before scaling up. 
After proving their feasibility, MoEHE hired a developer 
(Massader) to expand their operations.
Massader energy infrastructure developer (frontrunner)
The largest investment institution and the driver of the Pal-
estinian economy, the Palestinian Investment Fund (PIF), 
established Massader in 2015 to implement and lead pro-
jects worth $2.5 billion in the energy field. Despite their 
young age, they launched the ‘Noor Program’ to accomplish 
projects with a total capacity of 200 MW by 2026, which 
represents 17% of Palestinian’s peak load [49]. Due to the 
well-established history between PIF and the government, 
PENRA opened the door for Massader to obtain the required 
regulations for their projects from the Palestinian Cabinet to 
establish and lead ambitious projects. Massader gained this 
access because of their technical expertise, financial capa-
bilities, and national and international connections.
Massader was selected by MoEHE to be the project devel-
oper responsible for the installation of rooftop solar PV sys-
tems for 500 public schools [50]. The $35 million 4-year 
investment is planned to generate a capacity of 35 MW. Even 
though the project is planned to be completed in 2021, it 
influenced national plans to expand this project to cover 
all 2700 schools in Palestine (interview 7). Initial results 
are showing that the feasibility and availability of electric-
ity microgeneration on rooftops is an effective solution to 
overcome land restrictions (interview 8). Nonetheless, dis-
tributed power generation over hundreds of buildings is a 
complex process because it requires liaising with numerous 
stakeholders. Therefore, project actors formulated a network 
to transfer the set of proficiencies they developed to achieve 
the target of covering Palestinian schools’ rooftops with 
solar PV systems.
The internal management of this network is handled for-
mally throughout the creation of a project company in the 
form of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) structure (Fig. 10) 
that aims to assign clear scope of works to actors whilst 
ensuring all parties benefit in different ways. Furthermore, 
the program has a broader impact by creating awareness in 
public schools and weaving sustainable energy practices into 
Palestine’s teaching sphere (interview 6). This collaboration 
won the rooftop solar project for the year 2019 acknowledged 
by the Middle East Solar Association (MESA). The decen-
tralised nature of renewables made Massader develop and 
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use new business models that rely on connecting multi-level 
actors (Fig. 10). The model resulted in the establishment of 
novel partnerships whilst utilising hundreds of rooftops to 
compensate for the unavailability and inaccessibility of land 
due to conflict.
Municipalities
According to Articles (27) and (34) of the 2009 General 
Electricity Law [38], electricity distribution agencies, includ-
ing municipalities, are considered illegal and are obliged to 
join an established distribution company. The law reduced 
municipalities’ involvement in the energy sector (interview 
26). However, the fact that municipalities are still involved 
in electricity distribution (Fig. 9) raises questions about their 
potential role of in the energy transition. Survey results show 
that all 11 municipalities surveyed (including the biggest six 
municipalities) have reported projects implemented at differ-
ent scales whether on their facilities with rooftop solar PV 
systems, or utility-scale (300 KWp—5 MWp solar station), 
or even investing in LED technology for street lighting.
Table 3 in Appendix shows that all surveyed munici-
palities have also developed either their own independent 
renewable energy plans (sustainable energy action plans, 
SEAP), or integrated specific goals in their overall strategic 
municipal plan as a response to the increasing demand on 
renewable energy. Some of the municipalities such as Tubas, 
Nablus, and Jericho have taken this further to increase their 
scope of influence by establishing strategic energy bodies to 
manage, plan, and promote renewable energy.
The analysis of local municipal activities indicates that 
they embody the agency of niche level, according to TM and 
MLP. For example, the Municipality of Ajeh (Jenin gov-
ernate) reached 35–40% of its electricity from renewable 
sources. Furthermore, it has plans to reach 100% in case a 
transmission line is established to evacuate energy to other 
areas. Citizens and local investors collaborated to raise capi-
tal to support the municipality to build solar energy stations 
in Ajeh. The model in Fig. 11 demonstrated its effective-
ness because the municipality has a broad citizen access 
and can mobilise local investors for renewable energy pro-
jects, which is difficult to be attained by higher authorities’ 
centralised approach. Moreover, the municipal boundaries 
include abundant land under the Palestinian control (Areas 
A and B) to establish solar plants.
Municipalities are the closest institution to citizens and 
have been historically the main legitimate players even 
before the establishment of the Palestinian government [51]. 
Their role in the energy sector decreased in the past two 
decades and so their involvement in decision-making at the 
national level (interview 26). However, survey results show 
that municipalities have been voluntarily engaged in the 
field of renewable energy, and initial indicators are showing 
Fig. 10  Schools Project Business Model administered by Massader, 
which is responsible for mobilising the financials for the rooftop 
solar systems. The project will cover the full energy expenses of the 
involved schools, as well as providing a small amount of petty cash 
during high-generation months. Excess electricity will be sold to 
Palestinian DISCOs at competitive rates compared to imported elec-
tricity (0.35 USD/KhW), in addition to reducing technical losses as 
generation is close to the grid. At the national level, PENRA were 
able to obtain a special regulation from the Palestinian cabinet for 
this network to enable the business model over a large scale. Source: 
Modified from [50]
Fig. 11  The integrative model used by Ajeh municipality to imple-
ment solar PV stations. Source: Author
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that their efforts are effective. It is worth mentioning that 11 
municipalities were chosen by Clima-Med (Acting for Cli-
mate in South Mediterranean) to conduct Sustainable Energy 
and Climate Action Plan (SECAP) (interview 1). Therefore, 
the role of local authorities should be further investigated, 
and systemically included in the transition vision, agenda, 
and projects to accelerate the transition towards sustainable 
energy system.
Other key actors
The presence of International Development Organisations 
(IDOs) in sustainable infrastructure projects in Palestine 
is substantial. IDOs are considered to be a dynamic actor 
as they facilitate (between the Palestinian and Israeli side), 
strengthen and support the renewable energy sector at differ-
ent levels (strategic to operational) through policy transfers, 
projects and initiatives. The review of case studies shows 
that IDOs aim to rehabilitate the energy sector to reduce 
Palestine’s dependency on foreign aid and power their opera-
tions to meet the growing energy demand. Currently, IDOs’ 
role is significant in Palestine because of their financial and 
technical contribution. However, this means that IDOs can 
influence the way energy policy formulation and projects’ 
implementation. Gradually, their involvement is expected to 
have more impact on the shape of the energy transition as 
the sector continues to grow. This might shift Palestinian’s 
dependence from one source to another, which is a subject 
to be considered in future research.
Financial institutions are also emerging on the energy 
sector radar. The establishment of the ‘Revolving Fund’ 
project is a good example to illustrate how the inclusion of 
diverse actors such as banks in decision-making can yield 
in innovative proposals by identifying and developing unex-
ploited potential in the realm of energy transition. Currently, 
each line of ministry in Palestine is responsible for powering 
up their buildings with no common standards for energy 
fixtures. However, all energy bills are paid by one entity, 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Since ministries do not pay 
the bills themselves (not part of their expenses), they have 
little or no incentive to reduce their energy consumption. 
To overcome this obstacle, the ‘Revolving Fund’ was cre-
ated to enable investments in energy efficiency (EE) meas-
ures, which aims to reduce the energy bills of Palestinian 
ministries paid by MOF [52]. The unique business model 
(Fig. 12) grants one ministry at a time with funds to reduce 
their energy consumption. Then, a part of these savings from 
the implemented EE measures are transferred back to the 
fund to finance another ministry, creating a revolving effect 
to benefit various projects.
Financial institutions such as banks operate in a unique 
political and economic environment, where the adverse 
political conditions led to strengthening their capabilities 
to confront the various risks facing the financial sector in 
Palestine (interview 24). Lack of certainty and occupation 
control over the economic resources in Palestine has impli-
cations such as difficulties in reaching Palestinian areas 
(e.g. Gaza-Strip, Area C) due to Israeli military barriers and 
security measures. This entails additional costs for money 
transfers and providing further logistical requirements for 
the branches. Moreover, the absence of local currency, in 
addition to trading in three currencies in Palestine, is not 
encouraging for long-term lending, a crucial issue for renew-
able energy projects.
The financial sector, with the help of the Palestinian 
Monetary Authority (PMA), was able to develop tools and 
measures necessary to overcome such risks, in addition to 
launching conferences (e.g. Renewable Energy and Finance 
Opportunities in 2016) [53]. PMA issued instructions and 
procedures that focus on the overall stability of the Pal-
estinian financial system such as adding requirements for 
capital buffers and reserves, enhancing risk management, 
and strengthening the internal control environment. These 
improvements attracted new projects like SUNREF, which 
was launched in January 2019 in collaboration by AFD to 
provide local banks with an amount of 28 million euros to 
finance renewable and energy efficiency projects [54]. The 
initiative targets households and businesses to establish and 
foster their small-scale generation projects. Accordingly, 
financial institutions are considered now one of the key 
actors in the Palestinian energy transition. As banks focus 
on financial feasibility, spatial considerations might be over-
looked, an aspect that should be taken into consideration in 
future policy documents to avoid uneven development of 
renewable energy projects.
The ongoing efforts towards renewable energy transi-
tion are showing growth in governance networks. Actors 
Fig. 12  The financial flow model of the revolving fund; closed con-
tinuous cycle where savings from one project are mobilised for 
another energy efficiency project. Source: Author’s illustration based 
on PEC [52]
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mapping in Fig. 13 shows that horizontal interactions are 
prevailing in the renewable energy transition compared to 
conventional energy system that relies on top-down policy 
networks. Even though the government is the official body 
responsible for the energy sector, fieldwork findings are 
showing new emerging patterns between multi-level actors. 
These interactions are steering the renewable energy transi-
tion and generating transition dynamics.
Conclusion
In response to pressures imposed on the Palestinian energy 
sector, a new vision was released [37] to increase domestic 
generation and limiting imports to a maximum of 50% by 
2030. This paper argued that new governance models are 
required to conceptualise and guide the transition into a 
more sustainable direction. Transitioning towards renew-
able energy is not a change of technology only, but also 
a change in all societal domains and institutions. Accord-
ingly, this paper employed the transition management 
framework to answer the questions of who is governing the 
renewable energy transition in Palestine, and in what ways 
it is achieved. The choice of a Transition Management 
approach provided a better understanding of the renewable 
energy transition. TM framework offered a useful con-
ceptualisation of the energy sector, between the strategic, 
tactical and operational levels of governance, to analyse 
the involvements of multi-level actors and complement the 
existing governance structures.
Overall, the new strategies and projects related to the 
Palestinian energy transition are already changing the 
energy system but at a slow pace due to conflict forces. 
The analysis showed that actors are now closer to each 
other compared to the conventional energy system. This 
is because of efforts to connect actors to execute exem-
plary projects, which require a variety of capabilities and 
scope of influence from them. Moreover, interviews show 
that actors are keeping active and connected to remain 
updated and accumulate new knowledge to cope, adapt or 
transform to encountered change. However, actors’ efforts 
are still dispersed because of the geographical separation 
from conflict. Hence, the future of the Palestinian energy 
transition depends on how successfully actors maintain 
collaboration throughout periodic meetings and networks.
After examining the key renewable energy initiatives, it 
is concluded that the value of the energy transition in Pales-
tine is beyond technological change, but a road for independ-
ence. Moreover, the engagement of various multi-level actors 
raised attention towards the value of renewable energy as a 
solution for the persistent problems in the energy sector. The 
analysis also showed that governance capabilities are still not 
comprehensive or fully developed because traditional gov-
ernance models are embedded in the institutional structures. 
Fig. 13  Actors mapping for four projects at different levels and scales. Source: Author
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Nevertheless, governance tactics in the field of renewable 
energy are progressively changing as actors are showing flex-
ibility and gradual growth in networks and niche projects.
Regarding the governing actors, fieldwork findings showed 
that all of them experienced change and engaged with niche 
activities in one way or another. Three trends were spotted 
where change was manifested in actors. First, the establish-
ment of new institutions to fill gaps in the energy sector and 
to reorganise and monitor the energy market (Fig. 7). Second 
is the creation of new renewable energy departments within 
the internal structure of institutions. Third is the rise of new 
actors into the energy sector radar. The constellation of actors 
is found to be adding value to ongoing and future develop-
ments. Actors are bringing novel perspectives and expertise 
to tackle the various energy issues on different levels, instead 
of a single institution responsible for directing the entire pro-
cess. It is worth mentioning that the conflict is embedded in 
the Palestinian culture, which often blurs actors from moving 
forward. However, the energy transition is giving actors the 
chance to consider conflict forces to be one of the obstacles 
amongst others (e.g. economic, technology) to be able to 
maneuverer and implement their projects. For example, the 
flexibility and ease of execution of Solar PV systems allow 
actors to implement their project on a utility scale, and if 
rejected because of the political situation, to rescale or even 
change the location until approved. Unlike fossil fuel-based 
projects, such as establishing a gas-fired power plant, where 
conflict forces can hinder the entire development (e.g. gas 
imports are controlled by Israel).
The analysis of niche actors indicates that when exist-
ing regimes support them, it substantially enhances their 
performance, which is in line with the initial research 
hypothesis. This is witnessed in the government’s effort 
to support new institutions like Massader, which is accel-
erating the transition throughout novel schemes. The same 
can be applied to municipalities, where this paper contrib-
uted by investigating their current and potential role in the 
transition. This is to assess whether municipalities can be a 
potential candidate to be supported by high-level authori-
ties. Survey results confirm the initial assumption and lit-
erature [31, 55, 56] by highlighting that local authorities’ 
role is significant in the energy transition. Moreover, the 
analysis of local activities indicates that they embody the 
agency of niche level, according to MLP, which is chal-
lenging to be identified and executed by higher authorities’ 
centralised methodology.
Interview results revealed that the spread of renew-
able technologies was not the outcome of only top-down 
schemes; instead, throughout the collaboration of multi-
level institutions and increasing reliance on horizontal-
based networks, which is also in accord with both the 
researchers’ hypothesis and the various literature that sup-
port networks over singular centralised efforts [57]. The 
emergence of governance networks in the Palestinian energy 
sector implies that a single institution would be incompetent 
in managing the substantial socio-technical changes [18].
The application of the transition management approach 
on the Palestinian renewable energy transition revealed a 
few intervention points and recommendations. They include 
(1) acknowledge and deal with the energy system as a com-
plex but adaptive system whilst appreciating the context; (2) 
be more inclusive by reconsidering the role of existing and 
potential multi-level actors; (3) encourage new combina-
tion of strategies, technologies, and systematise knowledge 
sharing through governance networks; (4) be reflexive dur-
ing the governance process by monitoring interventions and 
revising policies accordingly; (5) align and connect national 
policies with the local level; and (6) breakdown conflict 
forces and assign them to TM levels to assess how and 
where it influences the energy transition to overcome them.
This paper employed the transition management frame-
work to acquire a better understanding of the renewable 
energy transition in Palestine. Future research should be 
directed towards an in-depth analysis of each level and 
phase of the transition. For example, how the transition 
agenda should address the spatial features of the energy 
transition; an aspect raised by many actors in various pro-
jects. Finally, research should assess transition pathways 
and whether existing capabilities and resources in Pales-
tine can achieve them.
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Table 2  List of interviews and 
roundtable discussions with 
participants’ positions and 
institutions
Labels Position Institution
Interview 1 Head of International Cooperation Ministry of Local Governance
Interview 2 Project manager Ministry of Local Governance
Interview 3 Minister Environment Quality Authority
Interview 4 Climate change advisor Environment Quality Authority
Interview 5 High level official Energy Authority (PENRA)
Interview 6 Head of renewables Energy Authority (PENRA)
Interview 7 Head of planning department Ministry of Education (MoEHE)
Interview 8 Senior engineer Ministry of Education (MoEHE)
Interview 9 High level manager Palestine Investment Fund (PFI)
Interview 10 Chief Engineer Massader
Interview 11 Mayor Beit Jala Municipality
Interview 12 Head of planning Beit Jala Municipality
Interview 13 GIS analyst Beit Jala Municipality
Interview 14 General manager Jerusalem Distribution Company (JEDCO)
Interview 15 Head of planning Jerusalem Distribution Company (JEDCO)
Interview 16 Bethlehem area manager Jerusalem Distribution Company (JEDCO)
Interview 17 General manager Hebron Distribution Company (HEPCO)
Interview 18 Senior engineer Hebron Distribution Company (HEPCO)
Interview 19 CEO Energy services consulting company
Interview 20 CEO Energy services consulting company
Interview 21 Project coordinator Japanese International Cooperation Agency
Interview 22 Strategic planning expert Prime Minster Office
Interview 23 Senior engineer KanDenko
Interview 24 Head of SMEs Bank of Palestine
Interview 25 President Birziet University
Interview 26 Legislation engineer Palestinian Electricity Regulatory Council
Interview 27 Chief engineer Jericho Municipality
Interview 28 Technical manager Palestine Incubator for Energy
Roundtable discussion 1 President American Arab University
Engineering team American Arab University
General manager Tubas Distribution Company (TEDCO)
Renewable energy engineer North Distribution Company (NEDCO)
Planning engineer North Distribution Company (NEDCO)
Roundtable discussion 2 Principle engineer Ramallah Municipality
Senior engineer Ramallah Municipality
Table 3  Key survey results from major municipalities in Palestine
Municipality Renewable energy plan/targets Rooftop solar PV Utility-scale solar PV Energy effi-
ciency plan/
actions
Current form of energy planning
Nablus Yes (targets in city strategy) Yes – Ongoing Committee
Tubas Yes (plan thru TEDCO) Yes Yes Yes Through TEDCO
Qalqilya Yes (targets in city strategy) Yes Completed Ongoing Established
Jericho Yes Yes Completed Ongoing Engineering Department
Ramallah Yes (targets in city strategy) Yes Under planning Yes Engineering Department
Al Bireh Yes (targets in city strategy) Yes Under planning Ongoing Planning Department
Bethlehem No, but Planning Yes Under planning Ongoing –
Beit Jala No, ongoing No; planning No Ongoing Through HEPCO
Hebron Yes No; ongoing Under planning Ongoing –
Jabalya, Gaza Yes (targets in city strategy) No; planning – – –
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